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Abstract This article attempts to shed new light on pre-
vailing puzzles of spatial scales in multi-level, participatory
governance as regards the democratic legitimacy and
environmental effectiveness of governance systems. We
focus on the governance re-scaling by the European Water
Framework Directive, which introduced new governance
scales (mandated river basin management) and demands
consultation of citizens and encourages ‘active involve-
ment’ of stakeholders. This allows to examine whether and
how re-scaling through deliberate governance interventions
impacts on democratic legitimacy and effective environ-
mental policy delivery. To guide the enquiry, this article
organizes existing—partly contradictory—claims on the
relation of scale, democratic legitimacy, and environmental
effectiveness into three clusters of mechanisms, integrating
insights from multi-level governance, social-ecological
systems, and public participation. We empirically examine
Water Framework Directive implementation in a compara-
tive case study of multi-level systems in the light of the
suggested mechanisms. We compare two planning areas in
Germany: North Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony.
Findings suggest that the Water Framework Directive did
have some impact on institutionalizing hydrological scales
and participation. Local participation appears generally both
more effective and legitimate than on higher levels, pointing
to the need for yet more tailored multi-level governance
approaches, depending on whether environmental knowl-
edge or advocacy is sought. We ﬁnd mixed results regard-
ing the potential of participation to bridge spatial ‘misﬁts’
between ecological and administrative scales of governance,
depending on the historical institutionalization of govern-
ance on ecological scales. Polycentricity, ﬁnally, appeared
somewhat favorable in effectiveness terms with some dis-
tinct differences regarding polycentricity in planning vs.
polycentricity in implementation.
Keywords Multi-level governance ● Re-scaling ●
Democratic dilemma ● Polycentric governance ● Sustainable
water resources management ● Mandated participatory
planning
Introduction
Fundamental questions in governance are related to issues
of scale, deﬁned here has the spatial conﬁguration of (multi-
level) governance systems. Such spatial conﬁgurations have
implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of political
outputs: While decision-making processes on smaller, more
local scales allow for the representation of large parts of the
community and directly correspond to their preferences,
many important environmental and sustainability issues can
only be tackled effectively on larger scales. More remote
from the citizens, however, decision-making on larger
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scales tends to fall short of democratic legitimacy. This
tension has been termed “democratic dilemma between
system effectiveness and citizen participation” (Dahl 1994).
It is of particular importance in environmental governance,
where issues are typically complex, with increasing spatial
connectedness, and transgressing administrative jurisdic-
tions (Meadowcroft 2002; Young et al. 2006). In order to
cope with such problems of spatial ‘misﬁt’ (Moss 2003;
Young 2002), functionally speciﬁc governance institutions
are increasingly implemented on scales that correspond to
the geographic boundaries of environmental problems
(Hooghe and Marks 2003). Following this trend, govern-
ance in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere is char-
acterized by a multiplicity of vertical, horizontal and
functionally speciﬁc levels of decision-making. Aiming to
balance diverse aspects of legitimacy and effectiveness,
such polycentric systems also tend to further increase
governance complexity, leading to problems of transpar-
ency and accountability (Peters and Pierre 2005). To cope
with these deﬁcits, the EU has undertaken efforts to
decentralize environmental decision-making and policy
implementation (Jordan 2002), including the involvement
of citizens and local interest groups. These efforts seek to
make governance more effective, for example by incor-
porating local knowledge into decisions and by generating
greater acceptance and implementation of decisions (Heinelt
et al. 2002), and at the same time enhance the legitimacy of
decision-making.
A prototypical example of such purposeful re-scaling is
the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). The WFD has
introduced new governance scales (mandated river basin
management) and demands consultation of citizens and
encourages ‘active involvement’ of stakeholders in the
course of its implementation (Jager et al. 2016; Kaika 2003;
Newig and Koontz 2014). This ‘re-scaled’ (Moss 2004)
structure of European water governance entails virtually all
of the above sketched scale-related puzzles of democratic
legitimacy and effective policy delivery, revolving around
non-state actor participation in mandated planning as the
central vehicle of WFD implementation.
While a diversity of disciplines—such as federalism
(Dahl 1994; Oates 2002), social ecological systems (Berkes,
Folke), or institutionalism (Ostrom, Young)—have been
contributing a variety of aspects, there is still surprisingly
little consolidated knowledge about how ‘scalar’ approa-
ches relate to effective and legitimate environmental gov-
ernance (Gerlak 2014; Newig and Fritsch 2009). This article
contributes to the conceptual literatures on scalar and multi-
level governance in that it systematically integrates the
scalar puzzles by formulating precise mechanisms and
discussing their empirical relevance in a comparative study
of WFD implementation in Germany. In doing so, this
article also contributes to the growing body of research on
the governance implications of WFD implementation. We
examine the triangular relations of scale, participation, and
the normative dimensions of environmental governance
(legitimacy and effectiveness) in order to address the
following research questions: (1) To what extent does
non-state actor participation on different levels of water
governance impact the legitimacy and effectiveness of
public decision-making? (2) To what extent does Dahl’s
(1994) ‘democratic dilemma’ empirically exist in WFD-
related multi-level systems? (3) What is the role of func-
tionally speciﬁc multi-level governance arrangements
(Hooghe and Marks 2003), institutionalized through river-
basin management, and how can participation in such
polycentric systems help overcome related problems of ‘ﬁt’
(Moss 2003)?
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
section 2, we lay out the conceptual framework, condensing
propositions from different streams of literature into (cau-
sal) mechanisms. These serve to guide empirical research of
a comparative case study of multi-level systems in the
context of WFD implementation (section 3). The research
design examines multiple levels from the EU to local
catchment level, focusing on two distinct planning areas in
Germany, the Wupper sub-basin in North Rhine Westphalia
and the Hase sub-basin in Lower Saxony (LS). Empirical
ﬁndings will be discussed in the light of the mechanisms
(section 4), before we conclude by reﬂecting on the overall
research approach and discuss avenues for further research
(section 5).
Theorizing on the Relation of Participation,
Scales, Levels, Democratic Legitimacy and
Environmental Effectiveness
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the key concepts of the
analysis, such as scale, level, polycentricity, participation,
legitimacy and effectiveness. Subsequently, we develop the
analytical framework, integrating assumptions from the
literature into a set of hypothesized causal mechanisms,
linking scale, level, polycentricity, and participation with
legitimacy and effectiveness.
Deﬁnition of Key Concepts
Relying on conceptual insights from different strands of
scholarly research, there are a number of somewhat con-
ﬂicting mechanisms concerning the relationship between
public participation and environmental outcomes. Gen-
erally, we assume that scales and levels of decision-making
as well as different types of participation inﬂuence out-
comes (Newig and Fritsch 2009).
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Drawing on existing conceptualizations of scale (Cash
et al. 2006; Gibson et al. 2000; Moss and Newig 2010), we
distinguish between scalar dimension and scalar level.
Scalar dimension refers to “an analytical dimension of a
problem under study” (Moss and Newig 2010: 4). In the
context of environmental governance, two dimensions are
of particular importance, namely the biophysical (here:
hydrological) and the institutional scalar dimension (Hein
et al. 2006). Scalar level denotes the “units of analysis that
are located at the same position on a scale” (Gibson et al.
2000: 218). Of particular importance to this research are the
different levels of the EU multi-level governance system
(e.g., EU—national—federal state—municipality), and the
levels on the hydrological scale (basin—sub-basin—
catchment).
In line with much current scholarship, we assess envir-
onmental governance against the criteria of democratic
legitimacy and effectiveness (see e.g., Hogl et al. 2012).
Based on the policy cycle model (Easton 1965), three
dimensions of democratic legitimacy can be distinguished
(Scharpf 1997; Schmidt 2013). Participation can play a
central role in achieving each of these forms of legitimacy
in public decisions. Input-oriented legitimacy refers to the
constitution of the (participant) decision-making body. A
central criterion is representation of those with a ‘stake’ or
other legitimate interest (see Fung 2006; Schmitter 2002 for
detailed criteria). The legitimacy of democratic decisions
rests to a large degree on the procedures employed, referred
to as ‘throughput.’ Democratic processes allow the
accommodation of different (often conﬂicting) interests,
ensure transparency and monitoring by those not involved.
This implies that procedures are fair and that participants
have an actual say in decisions. Finally, output-oriented
legitimacy, has been deﬁned as a measure of acceptance of
the output on the part of all affected parties (cf. Benz 2001).
Effectiveness, on the other hand, describes the sub-
stantive dimension of policy-making. Like legitimacy, the
concrete measurement of effectiveness is challenging
(Koontz and Thomas 2006; Newig and Fritsch 2009; Young
2011). This has to do with often complex causal chains of
intermediate steps from decision-making to tangible
impacts on environmental quality. To aid analysis, we draw
on the literature on the effectiveness of environmental
institutions (Mitchell 2008), distinguishing output, outcome
and impact. To this, we add the dimension of substantive
process quality. Applying this approach to the effectiveness
of participatory arrangements to reach the goals of the
WFD, i.e., the attainment of good ecological status, we
arrive at the following criteria:
● Process quality: the extent to which participation gauges
ecologically relevant information from participants that
can be included in the processes of planning and
developing measures for the implementation of the
WFD;
● Output: the extent to which decision outputs (River
Basin Management Plans (RBMP) and supplementary
documents such as “implementation timetables”) align
with the goals of the WFD;
● Outcome: indications of actual implementation of
measures toward reaching the WFD’s goals.
● Impact: Changes (improvements or deteriorations) of
water status (river structure, nutrient load, etc.) as
measured by states’ and EU ofﬁcial reports.
Several issues arise with this measurement of effective-
ness. First, we need reliable information on how informa-
tion was gathered from participants during participatory
processes. This has been possible in most cases. Second,
decision outputs (RBMP and other documents) must be
sufﬁciently clear in their content to allow for a comparison
with WFD aims and goals. In practice, plans are often either
quite general or remain vague or cryptic in the actual
measures they contain. Third, implementation activities on
the ground are manifold and often decentralized; our
assessment via interviews and document analysis reveals
indications but not necessarily a complete picture of
implementation activities. Finally, it is difﬁcult to assess the
actual impact of most of the implemented measures because
of the long-term nature of many of the involved biophysical
processes (Koontz and Thomas 2006). Notwithstanding
these methodological challenges, the diversity of indicators
employed does allow for a nuanced assessment of effec-
tiveness, including the uncertainties at stake.
Analytical Framework for Analysis
In the following, we summarize what emerges from several
literatures as key causal mechanisms. Following Elster
(1989), we suggest that “[a] mechanism explains by open-
ing up the black box and showing the cogs and wheels of
the internal machinery. A mechanism provides a continuous
and contiguous chain of causal or intentional links between
the explanans and the explanandum” (cited in Hedström and
Ylikoski 2010: 51). In our analysis, mechanisms link scale
and participation in governance with legitimate and effec-
tive environmental decision-making. We organize these into
three clusters regarding participation on small vs. large
scales (1), scalar ‘ﬁt’ (2), and polycentric governance (3).
Figure 1 presents an overview of all mechanisms. It is not
our intention, nor is it possible with the present research
design, to ‘test’ these assumptions with any standard of
rigor. Rather, we use these as a focused lens to discern
relevant issues in the studied cases of WFD implementation
that can be connected to and interpreted in the light of
existing conceptualizations.
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Participation and Scalar Level: Participation on Small
vs. Large Scalar Levels
Environmental federalism (Oates 2002) has long debated on
what level environmental decisions are most efﬁciently taken.
Much of the participation-related literature holds local-level
participation to be particularly suited to reaching effective
decisions (Bingham 1986). Citizens and stakeholders, includ-
ing environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
living in close proximity to the relevant environmental
resources are assumed to often possess a more detailed, com-
prehensive, and contextualized understanding of these resour-
ces than do the responsible authorities (Steele 2001; Thomas
1995). Local actor participation is thus expected to lead to
better informed decisions (Pellizzoni 2003; Yearley et al.
2003). Other scholars stress the importance of social cohesion
and the construction of social capital at local levels fostering
trust, commitment and ownership among participants and,
hence, contributing to a common problem-solving capacity
(Cheng and Daniels 2003; Newig and Fritsch 2009). Moreover,
solutions developed and rooted in such a socially cohesive and
committed environment are expected to more likely generate
high levels of implementation and greater compliance (Ostrom
1990). Taken together, these arguments constitute
Mechanism 1a: Participatory governance on low scalar
levels is conducive to environmental effectiveness.
Opposing this mechanism, and drawing again on Dahl
(1994), there are strong arguments to support that collective
matters with regard to environmental problems can typically be
dealt with more effectively on wider (e.g. national or suprana-
tional) rather on than very local scalar levels (Flynn 2000).
Given negative environmental spillovers (Benson and Jordan
2010) of local activities, attempts to solve such problems locally
represent a collective-action dilemma (Hardin 1968; Olson
1969). Moving to higher spatial levels of decision-making can
internalize such spillovers, making pro-environmental decisions
more likely. Moreover, local administration is assumed to be
more susceptible to lobbying (regulatory capture) by economic
development interests or—in a more favorable light—interested
to negotiate local exceptions from stricter national legislation
(van Stigt et al. 2016). In addition, participants at higher levels
of governance are assumed to possess greater professional
competency (Rockloff and Moore 2006), such that more sui-
table decisions in terms of ecological outputs are made at this
level. Hence, this mechanism states:
Mechanism 1b: Participatory governance on higher
scalar levels is conducive to environmental effectiveness.
When it comes to legitimacy, local decision-making is
expected to be better able to generate representative and
legitimate governance procedures (Dahl 1994; Loubier et al.
2005). This is due to the higher degree of commitment to,
identiﬁcation with, and interest in the local environment:
Mechanism 1c: The legitimacy of participatory
decision-making is inversely related to the scalar level
of governance.
Fig. 1 Overview of conceptual
framework comprising three
clusters of mechanisms, which
link scale-related factors to
environmental effectiveness and
democratic legitimacy
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Contrary to this mechanism, other scholars stress that the
views and values of the general public, particularly interests
that are not place-based (e.g. general welfare or ecological
conservation), are likely to be better represented on larger
geographic scales than at the local one, because with local
scales, local self-interest tend to prevail, disregarding the lager
common good (Soma and Vatn 2009). Furthermore, higher
level processes were found to comply better with principles of
representation and of professionalism overall, calling in to
question the legitimacy of more local procedures (Rockloff
and Moore 2006). Hence, this counter-mechanism states
Mechanism 1d: The legitimacy of participatory
decision-making is positively related to the scalar level
of governance.
Participation and Scalar Dimensions—Issues of Scalar Fit
Environmental problems typically are not conﬁned by strict
boundaries, and drivers for environmental processes may also
be situated on different scales, all of which typically cut across
political governance units. Such scalar “misﬁts” (Young 2002)
between ecological and governance scales cause spatial spil-
lovers and thus environmental ineffectiveness, which, given
their cross-boundary nature, cannot easily resolved through a
mere upscaling of governance-levels. The obvious response to
such scalar tensions is that administrative scales should be
adapted to ecological scales (Young 2002: 20, referring to
Berkes and Folke 1998). Participation is regarded as a
potential tool “to help us bridge the discontinuity between
geographical and jurisdictional boundaries found in water
resources management” (Delli Priscoli 2004), in particular if
stakeholders manage to adapt ﬂexibly to ecological scales
(Cash et al. 2006; Delli Priscoli 2004). Such actors then play
the role of intermediaries, operating between other actor
groups given their ability to work as boundary organizations
across different scales and contexts (Moss 2009):
Mechanism 2a: Participation of intermediary actors
helps to bridge scalar misﬁts.
As regards legitimacy, the alignment of governance pro-
cesses with hydrological boundaries is not unproblematic.
Political institutions based on set territories with unequivocal
membership draw on established mechanisms of legitimacy,
primarily elections and representation. Functional jurisdictions
such as watershed institutions, by contrast, lack a clear notion
of membership and therefore tend to perform less well on
classic criteria of representation (Meadowcroft 2002) and
accountability (Huitema et al. 2009; Peters and Pierre 2005).
This suggests that
Mechanism 2b: Participation on task-speciﬁc scales
tends to suffer from problems of legitimacy as
compared to participation on territorial scales.
Polycentric Governance Systems
In addition to the inﬂuence of individual scalar levels or
dimensions, the overall conﬁguration of the governance
system has to be taken into account. Here, polycentricity
refers to a system of many autonomous, independent, but
interacting, decision-making bodies with overlapping jur-
isdictions (for an overview see: Aligica and Tarko 2012).
This concept has widely been used to study natural resource
governance (Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Ostrom 2010).
Because they possess multiple decision points, it is argued
that polycentric governance systems have greater ﬂexibility
than monocentric ones in the event of sudden changes, and
their inherent redundancies are expected to produce a higher
diversity of possible solutions (Folke et al. 2005; Ostrom
et al. 1961), making these systems more effective:
Mechanism 3a: Polycentric systems are more effec-
tive, due to greater adaptability.
On the downside, polycentric systems are said to suffer
from high fragmentation and co-ordination costs (Huitema
et al. 2009). A polycentric—or, for that matter: frag-
mented—system may on the one hand be capable of
solving its own, particular problems, but may be unable to
address larger-scale challenges (Fung and Wright 2001).
Hence, the counter-mechanism reads
Mechanism 3b: Polycentric systems are less effective,
due to higher transaction costs.
When it comes to issues of legitimacy, multiple levels
with different venues of decision-making also bear the risk
of lacking transparency and problems of legitimacy (Benz
2001). These situations may lead to “responsibility ﬂoating”
(Bixler 2014), where responsibility over environmental
problems is constantly relocated by the actors within a
polycentric governance system. Hence, we state that
Mechanism 3c: The number of decision-making levels
and the overall complexity of the multi-level system
have a negative effect on the transparency and
legitimacy of the process.
Implementing the WFD: Certainly Multi-Level,
Somewhat Participatory, But Also Legitimate and
Effective?
The WFD arguably constitutes the ﬁrst principal EU policy
that aims to achieve substantive goals and to enhance
democratic legitimacy through deliberate re-scaling of
governance (Moss 2004). Following the ‘mandated parti-
cipatory planning’ approach (Newig and Koontz 2014), the
WFD deﬁnes material goals (good water status for all EU
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member states’ inland ground and surface waters), which
have to be met following elaborate procedural requirements.
These entail the development of RBMP and Programmes of
Measures (PoM) within a prescribed six-year planning
cycle, assessing current water conditions and deﬁning
actions to be taken to reach the overall goal of good water
status. These plans themselves serve as political programs
stipulating and guiding river basin management and the
implementation of measures in the respective river basin
districts. Participation of non-state actors1 plays a vital role
in this planning process. Relevant stakeholders and the
public must be encouraged to input on the production and
implementation of RBMP and PoM (with the ﬁrst cycle
plans due by 2009). In this, EU member states are given
substantial leeway in how to operationalize and approach
the overall goals and to design governance processes on this
way (Newig et al. 2014).
Case Selection and Research Methods
We investigate empirically the scalar particularities of WFD
implementation, considering participation across different
scales and levels. Our analysis is guided by the above-
formulated mechanisms. We compare original empirical
evidence from two case studies of participatory WFD
implementation in the German states of North-Rhine
Westphalia (NRW) and Lower Saxony (LS), focusing on
one sub-basin in each state. We selected these two states for
a number of reasons. First, both are large states with a mix
of urban and rural areas and a comparable population of
more than 10 million inhabitants. Second, both have a
different institutional legacy such that the WFD governance
structure arguably will play out differently in both settings.
Notably, NRW has administrative districts (Regier-
ungsbezirke) as an intermediate level of government, which
LS abolished in 2005; also, NRW has a long-standing tra-
dition of powerful semi-public water associations, which LS
and in fact most German states have not. Finally, data
acquisition has been greatly facilitated by pre-existing
relations of project members to a range of stakeholders in
both case study regions.
As Table 1 illustrates, the two states organized WFD
implementation in a complimentary way, with NRW con-
centrating participatory activities on local units below the
sub-basin scale, while in LS the sub-basin scale served as
the smallest governance unit. With its multiple levels of
decision-making, this analytical set-up yields a substantial
variety of more or less participatory decision-making pro-
cesses on different scalar levels and with varying degrees of
polycentric complexity.
Table 1 Participation mechanisms in the multi-level implementation system of the WFD, focusing on the two case regions. ‘Cons’ refers to the
formal consultation processes mandated by Art. 14 WFD
1 Non-state actors are understood as all stakeholders from civil society,
including citizens, and from private business, including farming, thus
excluding actors from government and administration.
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We analyzed ofﬁcial documents such as RBMP, PoM,
implementation timetables, and basin reports, including
evaluations and assessments by EU and national agencies;
further, secondary literature, internal memos, protocols,
websites, and email correspondence. For a comprehensive
understanding of the interests at stake, the participatory
processes and their outcomes, we conducted guided inter-
views at the levels of the EU, Germany, the two federal
states, and municipalities. A total of 27 interviews were
conducted between April 2011 and February 2013 with
decision makers and process organizers, as well as with
representatives of interest groups and associations. They
lasted on average between one and two hours. We per-
formed a content analysis of the interview transcripts and
the additional case material. Using the analysis software
MAXqda, the case material was structured into context,
process, output, and implementation (127 codes), and
ordered by relevance for each mechanism. Quotes are
marked in the text and can be found in the online supple-
mentary material. In this way, we reconstructed the parti-
cipatory processes and linked them to their respective
substantial and social outputs.
North-Rhine Westphalia
In NRW, the state environmental ministry is charged with
WFD implementation. In 2005, operative implementation
was assigned to the four district governments. Our core
example is the river Wupper, a tributary to the Rhine with a
length of 115 km (see Fig. 2). The Wupper sub-basin is a
heavily populated area with ~890,000 inhabitants. Diverse
water uses (tourism, agriculture, industry, hydroelectricity)
have led to some conﬂicts and environmental degradation in
the past. The Wupper sub-basin cuts across the Düsseldorf
and Cologne district governments, with a lead role assigned
to the Düsseldorf government. For planning purposes, the
sub-basin was further divided into three planning units of
Upper Wupper, Lower Wupper, and Dhünn.
Aside from the district governments, a water board—the
‘Wupperverband’—is one of the principal actors in the area.
This sub-basin-wide public body was established by the
government in 1930 and is responsible for the main water
management tasks (e.g., water body maintenance, waste-
water treatment, and water supply). Municipalities, water
utilities, and larger industrial enterprises are obligatory
members of the Wupperverband and pay substantial fees
(Moss 2012).
Round Tables
In NRW, stakeholders were involved in Round Tables
between 2008 and 2009. In the Wupper area, these were
organized by the district government of Düsseldorf and held at
the level of the planning units Upper Wupper, Lower Wupper,
and Dhünn. Their aim was to include local knowledge into the
planning process (District Government Düsseldorf 2008a).
Their output served as a proposal for the production of RBMP
and PoM by the state environmental ministry.
The district government selected the participants, tar-
geting mostly organized stakeholders related to water
management. For example, the ﬁrst Round Table of the
planning unit Lower Wupper involved 21 participants, the
second 49 participants, and the third 43 participants
including representatives of district governments Düsseldorf
and Cologne, the Wupperverband, municipalities, farmers
association, an environmental NGO ('Naturschutzbund
Germany’ - NABU), land owners, infrastructure operators,
water utilities etc. (District Government Düsseldorf 2008b).
According to an interviewee, many participants primarily
attended out of concern for negative consequences for their
constituency (Interview LANUV, quote #1). One of the
crucial points during discussions was the voluntary nature
of the implementation process (Interview district govern-
ment, quote #2).
It was agreed that only generic measures but no concrete
proposals for action were to be included in the ofﬁcial PoM,
while concrete measures were only documented in back-
ground papers (District Government Düsseldorf 2008a,c).
The more detailed ideas for speciﬁc measures that were
gathered during the Round Tables were transferred to the
next stage, the ‘cooperations’, which are discussed below.
One interviewee characterized the Round Tables as a place
Fig. 2 The case study regions of Lower Saxony with the Hase sub-
basin and North-Rhine Westphalia with the Wupper sub-basin, located
in the north-western part of Germany. Own drawing created with
stepmap.de
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for information presentation by the organizers and general
discussion, while little input was actually solicited from
stakeholders (Interview district government, quote #3).
Other interviewees felt that every participant was at least
given the opportunity to voice his or her opinion or interest,
and that these concerns were taken up for consideration
(Interviews local agriculture association; water association,
quote #4). Participants also reported that the Round Table
allowed them to establish informal relationships with other
stakeholders that made it easier to cooperate with them
(Interview chamber of agriculture, quote #5) and to learn
about the implementation process (Interview district gov-
ernment, quote #6).
Local Cooperations
In NRW, concrete planning, elaboration, and prioritization of
measures to implement the WFD was done in local ‘coop-
erations’. In the Wupper area, three cooperations were cre-
ated at the level of planning units, organized by the
Wupperverband. In order to allow for intense participation,
cooperations were sub-divided into a total of 10 working
groups that covered small areas such as speciﬁc water bodies.
Each working group had between 13 and 60 participants2.
Following introductions into the planning process by experts
of the Wupperverband or the water authorities, participants
had the opportunity for in-depth discussion of measures
using prepared maps and graphic tools (e.g., Wupperverband
2011). Between 2010 and 2012, among the three coopera-
tions, a total of 25 workshops were conducted in which more
than 100 stakeholders participated (Wupperverband 2012).
Each cooperation summarized its planning results in a map
containing detailed information on potential measures con-
cerning their feasibility, priority, costs, and impacts. These
results were incorporated into ‘implementation timetables’,
planning documents that included the maps and lists of
measures and which were published in 2012, serving as a
concretization of the RBMP and PoM3.
Symposium
In 2010, the district government and the Wupperverband
established a joint symposium for the whole Wupper area.
This format resulted from a fusion of two separate but
similar annual meetings, which previously had been held by
each of the two public bodies on their own. The symposium
is held annually and aims primarily at informing a broader
audience of stakeholders on the current progress of WFD
implementation, and secondarily at discussing issues of
water resource management in more general terms.
Substantive Outcomes
For all German river basin districts, including those in NRW
and LS, the ofﬁcial planning documents of RBMP and PoM
turned out to provide only cursory information on concrete
measures and their implementation (European Commission
2012). Hence, these documents do not lend themselves to
substantially assess measures and action on the ground,
let alone their attribution to the planning process and partici-
pation of stakeholders. In NRW, the environmental ministry
compensated for sparse information in the planning docu-
ments by publishing more detailed ‘fact sheets’. These contain
substantive outputs and potential programmatic measures in a
more ﬁne-grained way on the level of sub-basins and even
catchments (NRW Ministry of the Environment 2009).
Additionally, in the Wupper area, the implementation time-
tables contained concrete measures and actions on the ground
(Wupperverband 2012). These identify more than 900 single
measures for the Wupper’s three planning units covering
diverse areas such as morphology, point source pollution, land
use, or ﬁshery. Measures span from efforts to enhance the
information basis through further studies and monitoring to
substantive and cost-intensive infrastructure measures, such as
the relocation of riverbeds or the removal of artiﬁcial barriers.
Despite the major expenditures that some of these measures
entail, only nine measures were assessed as impossible, while
almost 70% had already implemented or deemed possible in
2012 by the Wupperverband, who is charged with imple-
mentation (Wupperverband 2012). With this, the Wupper
ranges above the German average when it comes to measure
implementation: a recent evaluation on behalf of the EU
Commission (WRc plc 2015) for all German river basins
estimated an average of 50–68% being under implementation.
Water status in the Wupper sub-basin improved during the
last WFD cycle between 2008 and 2014. The number of
water bodies with good or better ecological status doubled in
this time, constituting now around a quarter of water bodies in
the sub-basin. At the same time the share of water bodies with
poor or bad water status or potential decreased by 40 percent,
indicating an overall positive trend. Main persisting issues in
the sub-basin are hydro-morphological deﬁcits, i.e., severely
altered river beds offering only sparse aquatic habitats, pas-
sability for ﬁsh, and pressures from urban settlements (North
Rhine Westphalia Ministry of Environment 2015). Attributing
these positive developments in environmental quality directly
to the processes and activities described above appears pro-
blematic, as alterations in river structures may show their
environmental impact only after some time lag. Notwith-
standing these caveats, improvements in water status often
occurred regarding the river structure and habitats, which was
2 See https://www.wupperverband.de/internet/mediendb.nsf/gfx/
6B5A7EA631FBD243C12579E400417AC8/$ﬁle/Text%20Begrue%
C3%9Fung.pdf. (last accessed 14 July 2016).
3 http://wupperverband.de/internet/web.nsf/id/pa_de_planungseinheiten.
html (last accessed 14 July 2016).
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targeted in multiple measures developed in the participatory
processes.
Lower Saxony
The responsible authority for WFD implementation is the LS
Ministry of the Environment, with operative implementation
carried out by the environmental state agency ('Nie-
dersächsischer Landesbetrieb für Wasserwirtschaft, Küsten-
und Naturschutz' - NLWKN). We focus on the Hase area, a
sub-basin of the river Ems, which is characterized by agri-
culture and intensive livestock farming. Excess production
of liquid manure has resulted in high pressure on ground and
surface water due to high nitrate concentrations. Intensive
agriculture has come to be a part of the region’s identity and
“is reﬂected by the interests and perceptions of many actors
involved in the implementation process of the WFD”
(Kastens and Newig 2008).
Area Forums
The earliest major form of public involvement were the area
forums, established by the environmental ministry. From
2004 to 2009, these were held annually in four hydro-
logically deﬁned regions, with up to 100 participants
attending each meeting. The ministry used the area forums
to give an account of the overall progress of the imple-
mentation process and of technical aspects. These formats
were criticized as lacking sufﬁcient feedback possibilities
on the part of participants (Ridder et al. 2007).
Area Cooperations
As a more active form of involvement, LS established 30
local ‘area cooperations’ in 2005, on the level of sub-basins.
According to a ministerial decree (Lower Saxony Ministry
of Environment 2005), area cooperations were designed to
accompany the whole WFD implementation process. How-
ever, no formal decision-making competence was transferred
to the participants, which was seen critically in an earlier
assessment (Kastens and Newig 2008). The state govern-
ment provided each cooperation with an annual budget of
15,000 Euro for implementing measures (Kommunale
Umwelt-AktioN U.A.N. 2008). The area cooperation cov-
ering the Hase sub-basin met several times per year from
2006 to 2009 and just annually thereafter. Initially, it was
intended to involve one representative of each stakeholders
group, such as administrative counties and municipalities,
farmers associations, business, water boards, environmental
NGOs, and regionally speciﬁc actors (e.g., dyke associa-
tions, ﬁsheries). However, as municipalities could not agree
on one representative, several were accepted. Other orga-
nized interests such as the ﬁsheries requested inclusion in the
Hase area cooperation. Some interviewees saw this as a clear
disadvantage because larger groups made discussions more
difﬁcult and harder to moderate (Interview maintenance
association, quote #7), reducing the possibilities for dialogue
and discussion (Interview environmental organization, quote
#8). In contrast to the municipalities, environmental orga-
nizations had problems ﬁnding a capable representative for
each area cooperation (Interview environmental organiza-
tion, quote #9).
During the Hase area cooperation meetings, different
interests of participants became apparent: Agricultural repre-
sentatives and water maintenance boards stressed the function
of ﬂowing water bodies for agriculture, seeing little room for
space intensive and costly natural development of water
bodies (Interviews maintenance organization; agricultural
association, quote #10). Some of the municipalities and other
stakeholders saw the WFD as a chance to stress the rivers’ use
for people’s well-being, recreational interests and tourism
(Interview county; environmental organization, quote #11, see
also quote #20). The tension between (agricultural) land use
and environmental protection created some controversy, but
no heated conﬂicts were reported (Interview water treatment,
quote #12). A great obstacle to the whole process was the
unresolved question of ﬁnancing because only few small
measures could be implemented with 15,000 Euro per year
(Interview maintenance association; agricultural association,
quote #13). In terms of capacity building, three maintenance
associations in the sub-basin regions formed an umbrella
organization in order to increase the capacity to implement
measures and the municipalities established means of infor-
mation exchange. The interviews indicate that participants
valued the input of information, provided mainly by the
NLWKN, as well as the opportunity to get to know the
interests and positions of other stakeholders (Interview
maintenance association; water treatment, quote #14).
Substantive Outcomes
Although participants contributed to the compilation of lists
that named concrete measures (Interview NLWKN, quote
#15), these were not included in the ﬁnal RBMP or PoM,
which listed generic measures only, similar to those
in NRW. This is in line with ﬁndings from other area
cooperations (Koontz and Newig 2014) and an EU eva-
luation of all German basins (European Commission 2012).
The NLWKN published data sheets for each water body,
listing core pressures and prioritized measure suggestions




gewaesser-im-bearbeitungsgebiet-hase-112997.html (last accessed 21
September, 2015).
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around 300 measures, covering areas such as morphology,
connectivity, point source, and especially also diffuse
source pollution. Furthermore, the area cooperation assisted
in the declaration of water bodies as natural, artiﬁcial,
or heavily modiﬁed. After some discussions, a large number
of water bodies were classiﬁed as heavily modiﬁed
(HMWB) (Interview environmental organization, quote
#16).
Actual implementation of measures was and is based on
a voluntary model. Action on the ground depends on the
commitment and engagement of local governments,
authorities, and stakeholders in the basin, who are encour-
aged to implement identiﬁed measures with ﬁnancial
support from the state government (Koontz and Newig
2014). However, potential co-implementers felt that this
WFD process had complicated the implementation of
measures due to an increase in bureaucracy (Interview
maintenance association, quote #17). Furthermore, this
decentralized procedure resulted in the disregard of major
issues of agricultural pollution, notably nutrients. A recent
EU-ordered evaluation of WFD implementation in Ger-
many (WRc plc 2015) found for the Ems basin as a whole
that for more than 85 % of all measures to reduce nutrient
pollution in agriculture—beyond the requirements of the
Nitrates Directive—implementation has not yet started until
2012. On the other hand, implementers reported some
progress in the revitalization of river banks (Interview
ﬁshery, quote #18) and the removal of other obstacles
(Interview maintenance association, quote #19). Many
municipalities saw the WFD as an opportunity to conduct
projects that combined the aim of natural development with
other objectives such as creating value for tourism or
ensuring ﬂood protection (Interview municipal association,
municipality, quote #20).
The actual impacts of these measures for the water
status in the sub-basin and beyond are hard to assess.
Surface and groundwater assessments undertaken in 2014
as part of the subsequent WFD planning cycle show
that only 1 % of all surface waters of the whole Ems basin
is of good or better ecological status with more than 80 %
of poor or bad ecological status or potential. In the
Hase sub-basin, only 2 out of more than 70 water bodies
acquired good ecological status. Compared to the 2008
assessment, improvements are marginal. Groundwater
quality even deteriorated in one of the aquifers in the
sub-basin. Main pressures continue to be diffuse pollution
from agriculture as well as river development and con-
struction (Lower Saxony Ministry of Environment 2015,
NLWKN 2009, 2012). These not only affect the water
status in the basin but also contribute to considerable
eutrophication in the German and Dutch North Sea coastal
waters (Bund-Länder Arbeitsprogramm Meeresumwelt
2011).
Discussion in the Light of the Mechanisms
Having examined the different participation mechanisms
employed in the two case regions in some detail, we now
take a more analytical perspective and relate these ﬁndings
to the mechanisms formulated at the outset (Table 2).
Participation at Small vs. Large Scalar Levels
Intensive, interactive forms of participation were mostly
organized on a sub-basin level or, in the case of the Wupper,
in cooperations on an even more local level. Less intensive
forms of participation such as formal consultations, the
Council, and in LS the area forums were organized on
higher spatial levels. Interviews suggest that participants
often found the group size too large for meaningful dis-
cussion, but overall had the possibility to voice their inter-
ests (Interview maintenance association, quote #8).
Intensive deliberations mostly took place in very local set-
tings, such as working groups.
Regarding effectiveness (M1a and M1b), our ﬁndings
provide some evidence that local participation is conducive
to WFD planning processes. In the Hase case, key stake-
holders’ knowledge on different aspects of water manage-
ment proved valuable for naming measures and compiling
lists, as well as for capacity building (all of which would not
likely have been possible on a more aggregated governance
level). Even more so, the cooperations in NRW, which were
held on yet more local scalar levels, succeeded to include
local knowledge by providing detailed maps and imple-
mentation timetables and working on speciﬁc water bodies.
The NRW approach thus re-scaled participation from the
sub-basin down to a more local level in order to enhance
effectiveness, particularly regarding process quality and
outputs, thus, supporting mechanism M1a. In support of
M1b, however, it became apparent that the LS area coop-
erations were situated on too local a level for environmental
groups to meaningfully engage. The ﬁsheries representative
in the Hase area, for example, did not represent the full
spectrum of environmental concerns and was, notably, no
expert in nutrient issues. On a more aggregated spatial level,
such as the state, environmental groups are organized more
professionally, not having to rely on voluntary engagement.
Whether or not M1a or M1b holds thus appears to depend on
whether participation is to mainly solicit environmental
knowledge (favoring local processes—M1a) or whether it
seeks to promote environmental advocacy (favoring less
local processes—M1b). The dilemma of the LS approach,
then, was that the area cooperations tried to achieve both
which they could not. NRW, however, with its more ﬂexible
and multi-leveled approach of both soliciting local knowl-
edge and allowing for effective NGO representation at more
aggregated levels, proved superior in effectiveness terms.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1008 Environmental Management (2016) 58:998–1014
As regards the legitimacy of decision-making, the ana-
lysis indicates that the re-scaling to rather local
decision-making does beneﬁt participants’ commitment and
identiﬁcation with the area and the possibility to address
speciﬁc issues during the participation process (M1c).
However, in the Hase region, stakeholders expressed that
the area cooperation was still covering too large an area to
identify with the whole region and to discuss particular
measures (Interview environmental organization, quote
#21). The larger group size resulting from this wider geo-
graphic scope further hampered the discussion climate. To
strengthen identiﬁcation among the participants, the area
cooperation organized ﬁeld trips to particular water bodies,
which stakeholders were chieﬂy interested in and which
corresponded to their more local sense of place (M1c). In
the Wupper case, the cooperations established working
groups on an even more local scale, where affected stake-
holders had access to and could discuss measures for spe-
ciﬁc water bodies. This increased ownership on behalf of
the participants and led to a high appreciation of the process
(Interview nature protection, quote #22).
At the same time, these small-scale participatory pro-
cesses revealed deﬁcits concerning input legitimacy (repre-
sentation) (providing support for M1d): In both Wupper and
Hase cases, environmental organizations relying on volun-
tary action by their members (as is typical for local envir-
onmental organizations) faced difﬁculties to represent their
interest in each venue. In the Hase region, environmentalists
were not able to nominate a member of a genuine environ-
mental group. In the Wupper case, stakeholders from
voluntary organizations also reported difﬁculties to attend
activities they were invited to (Interview local agricultural
association, quote #23). These ﬁndings suggest that highly
local participation overburdens voluntary organizations
regarding their personnel, time and ﬁnancial resources—a
phenomenon which would likely have been less pronounced
in participatory formats on more aggregated levels.
To conclude, we ﬁnd mixed results regarding Dahl’s
(1994) proclaimed dilemma between legitimacy through
participation (more likely to be attained in local decision-
making) and effectiveness (more likely to be attained at more
aggregated levels). In fact, both effectiveness and legitimacy
were scale-dependent but not in a straightforward way.
Contrary to Dahl’s expectation, local processes did appear
effective in the sense of information-gauging and working
toward implementation of measures (as opposed to a coun-
terfactual situation of tackling these issues at a more aggre-
gated scale). However, the actual WFD planning documents,
that were to address the overall water-related problems in a
larger unit, lacked the rigor and concreteness to be effective,
e.g., in terms of tackling the overall nitrate problem in LS.
Thus, we ﬁnd a trade-off between vague outputs (plans) and
more effective outcomes (implementation). In terms of
legitimacy we found that the more local, the more stake-
holders identiﬁed with and accepted decision-making pro-
cesses but that very local processes did less well regarding
access and representation of groups (in particular NGOs).
The key scale-related trade-off thus appears not one between
legitimacy and effectiveness, but between the different
dimensions within the broader concepts of both effectiveness
and legitimacy, thus challenging conventional assumptions.
Scalar Fit
Our ﬁndings suggest that in both cases a misﬁt between
hydrologically and politically delimited institutions was of
concern. Both the Hase and the Wupper sub-basins cross
the jurisdictions of multiple local authorities, creating mis-
ﬁts between political scales of interest representation and
the newly introduced, hydrologically oriented governance
units. According to mechanism M2a, such misﬁts are likely
to be bridged through participation. In the Hase case, some
stakeholders such as the maintenance associations, the
environmental NGO and the water utilities are in fact
organized along hydrological boundaries. As inter-
mediaries, their participation partly helped to communicate
between the logic of sub-basin management and the logic of
municipal and county administration. In the Wupper case,
the misﬁt between political and hydrological scales is less
pronounced because the Wupperverband has a long-grown
structure accommodating the hydrological scale dimension.
This association, therefore, served as important inter-
mediary between the political institutions and the different
processes on the water body level, such as the local
cooperations.
With regard to M2b, functionally delimited institutions
such as those on hydrological scales are suspected to suffer
from a lack of legitimacy. Our case studies partly support
this mechanism. In LS, the area cooperations, while cutting
across established territorial boundaries, in theory allowed
only one representative of each jurisdictional level (Lower
Saxony Ministry of Environment 2005). Consequently,
counties and municipalities did not feel appropriately
represented in this setting (Kommunale Umwelt-AktioN U.
A.N. 2006a, b; Lower Saxony Ministry of Environment
2006). This eventually led to an expanded group, allowing
for extended representation at the expense of a less pro-
ductive working atmosphere. In the Wupper basin, a suc-
cessful attempt was made to circumvent the M2b problem
through a multi-layered structure that allowed for greater
stakeholder inclusion (see also Hüesker and Moss 2015).
Representation was further enhanced by the targeted
selection of stakeholders for different arenas following a
stakeholder analysis (Seecon 2007).
Our ﬁndings thus suggest that scale-adapted governance
on functionally delimited scales pose a challenge to
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legitimacy. We may reasonably assume that on those local
scales relevant to our study (sub-basin), pollution spillovers
(e.g., regarding nitrate pollution of ground and surface
waters) are not so pronounced that governance on hydro-
logical scales will actually outperform. Where stakeholders
are organized according to ecological boundaries, problems
of legitimacy will result.
Polycentric Governance System
With regard to the overall governance system put into place
for WFD implementation and its polycentricity, we ﬁnd
substantial differences between LS and NRW. To understand
the relevant differences, it is useful to distinguish the insti-
tutional set-up of the planning process (i.e., the preparation of
RBMP and PoMs) and that of the process of implementing
measures on the ground (illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4).
In LS, planning has been essentially centralized and
mainly in the hands of the environmental ministry and the
NLWKN, whereas the inﬂuence of participatory area
cooperations remained limited. Implementation of mea-
sures, on the other hand, has been organized decentrally.
Many different actors, such as water maintenance boards
and municipalities are expected to assume responsibility for
the implementation of measures, using the area cooperation
as a means of information exchange (Kommunale Umwelt-
AktioN U.A.N. 2006a). Interviews reveal that some of these
actors indeed realized measures, reacting ﬂexibly to local
circumstances (in support of M3a). On the downside, and in
support of M3b, interviewees point to the coordination costs
of such a decentralized and fragmented system, such as the
municipalities who initiated a coordinating body (Interview
county, quote #24).
In NRW, the WFD implementation system is both more
and less polycentric than in LS: while planning is more
polycentric, implementation is less so (cf. Fig. 3). Different
from LS, WFD-related planning competencies are dis-
tributed over the district governments as well as the water
boards such as the Wupperverband (in those sub-basins in
which they exist). Both structures compete but also colla-
borate, this being a typical indicator of polycentricity. The
numerous participation mechanisms put into place on dif-
ferent levels and which contributed to the planning efforts,
added to this polycentricity. The overall effect of this
polycentricity on planning quality is certainly difﬁcult to
measure. However, the elaboration of implementation
timetables, which identify very concrete measures (as
opposed to planning in LS), is clearly a comparative ‘suc-
cess’, and arguably due in part to the integration of various
sources of knowledge by local stakeholders. Moreover, the
Wupperverband, competing with the district government,
assumed a leadership role, provided considerable resources
and served as a source of innovation (Hüesker and Moss
2015). Implementation of measures, again different from the
LS model, was guided more strongly by central actors
(Wupperverband, district government) rather than leaving it
solely to local actors. Considering the overall positive trend
in the ecological water statues, there is no indication to
believe that this model was less ‘successful’ as compared to
the LS approach in terms of progress toward WFD goals.
Are polycentric systems less legitimate in terms of
representation and accountability (M3c)? On the one hand,
the complex participatory structures did increase input-
oriented legitimacy as compared with the pre-WFD situa-
tion in both case regions. In NRW, where polycentricity
was highest in the WFD planning realm, competing struc-
tures (Wupperverband vs. district government) may have
decreased transparency and thus accountability. However,
the Wupperverband was legitimized by formal decisions by
its members. Legitimacy suffered somewhat because the
multitude of different venues for participation was over-
whelming for some of the actors, making it difﬁcult for
Fig. 4 WFD implementation structure in Lower Saxony
Fig. 3 WFD implementation structure in North-Rhine Westphalia
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them to decide where to participate. In LS, the high poly-
centricity in the implementation realm, closely linked to a
lack of central co-ordination or guidance of implementation,
entailed a lack of transparency of what measures are
implemented by whom as well as a potential withdrawal of
state responsibility.
Conclusions
The European WFD attempts to rescale competences of
water governance in a newly fashioned multi-level system
of mandated participatory planning. This constitutes an
experiment for governments, involved stakeholders and
citizens across the European Union. German federalism has
produced 16 such experiments, as each federal state pursues
its own strategy of setting up participation mechanisms. Our
comparative study of two such cases reveals, ﬁrst, that the
WFD did impact on institutionalizing hydrological gov-
ernance scales and participation. Participation has been put
in place in various forms and on multiple levels of gov-
ernance, showing distinct differences between the two
studied cases. Contrary to expectations, governance com-
petences have scarcely shifted toward hydrological scales
but remain with the federal states, with limited cross-border
cooperation in river basins. In NRW, the Wupperverband,
acting on sub-basin scale, has been strengthened and partly
assumed competences originally held by the district gov-
ernments. In LS, area cooperations were implemented on
sub-basin and catchment scales, but had little inﬂuence on
planning.
Did the WFD succeed in improving both effective water
governance and democratic legitimacy of decision-making
through its re-scaling approach? Or do scale-related
dilemmas prevail?
As regards Dahl’s (1994) ‘democratic dilemma’ and the
local—supra-local dualism, the message taken from the case
study comparison is not unequivocal: Given the complexity
of water management issues to be tackled for WFD
implementation, the more local decision processes appeared
both more effective (in the sense of producing better
informed and more meaningful outputs) and more legit-
imate (in terms of relating closer to citizen and stakeholder
interest). On the other hand, local processes in LS were
more susceptible to being dominated by economic (agri-
cultural) interests, working against strict water protection.
To a lesser degree, the argument of greater effectiveness of
higher-level decision-making proved relevant, namely the
positive effect of central guidance on measures imple-
mentation in NRW (which was largely lacking in LS). This
relative superiority of local as opposed to higher-level
decision-making must, of course, be interpreted against the
more local nature of most water management issues
encountered in the two case regions. A key factor deter-
mining whether local or less local processes are more
effective depended on whether environmental knowledge or
environmental advocacy is sought.
Was participation able to bridge ‘misﬁts’ between eco-
logical (i.e., hydrological) and administrative scales of
governance, or did this introduce new problems of legiti-
macy? Water-related, task-speciﬁc governance scales con-
ﬂicted with established notions of territorially based
representation and legitimacy, thus creating scalar ‘misﬁts’.
This was more pronounced in LS, with area cooperations
crossing territorial boundaries, as compared to the
NRW-model, in the Wupper case due to the strong role of
the grown basin-oriented water board. While the participa-
tion of actors organized along the sub-basin boundaries in
the Hase did appear to bridge misﬁts, problems of legiti-
macy and representation remained. Whether participation
helps to bridge scale-related misﬁts appears to depend on
the institutional history, with grown structures more likely
to perform than fresh reforms of re-scaling.
Polycentricity, ﬁnally, appeared somewhat favorable in
effectiveness terms. Our analysis suggests to distinguish
between governance polycentricity of the planning system
and that of the implementation system. Higher polycentricity
in planning in NRW proved successful due to competing
structures, while higher polycentricity in implementation in
LS proved less conducive to both effectiveness and legiti-
macy. Clearly, this distinction between the planning and the
implementation stage will warrant further enquiry.
Three caveats must be mentioned with regard to our
assessment. First, contrary to earlier expectations, it has
become apparent that the ofﬁcial planning documents
(RBMP and PoM) were not used as the central vehicle for
the development and implementation of measures on the
ground, but rather as a means to symbolically report to the
Commission. Instead, the initiated governance mechanisms
triggered activities such as the elaboration of additional
plans (implementation timetables in NRW) or the promo-
tion of voluntary initiatives (LS) (see Koontz and Newig
2014). Second, the environmental impact of the studied
processes and their outputs cannot yet be fully evaluated.
Ecological data is still sparse and often real impacts of
implemented measures become visible only after some time.
Finally, the relevance of the hydrological scales involved in
this case study (and similar others) is arguably questionable
(Ingram 2011) and ultimately remains an empirical issue.
This points to the politics involved in the re-scaling of
governance, which has been highlighted in the critical
human geography literature (Hüesker and Moss 2015).
Beyond, but related to the initial assumptions contained
in the three sets of mechanisms, three key insights emerge
from this empirical study. First, a major re-scaling effort
such as the one introduced by the WFD cannot easily
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resolve scale-related trade-offs between effectiveness and
legitimacy. Rather, grown, co-evolved institutional struc-
tures appear more important than ‘optimized’ scalar gov-
ernance arrangements. Second, the dualism of effectiveness
vs. legitimacy appears less pronounced than potential trade-
offs between dimensions within either concept. Third, the
concept of polycentricity appears more diverse than initially
assumed and can be disentangled into polycentricity in
planning and polycentricity in implementation.
The ﬁndings reported here are of wider importance to
related attempts at governance re-scaling through mandated
participatory planning. Such new governance modes
appear, for example, in the Floods Directive, that mandates
ﬂood risk management plans to be produced until 2015 on
the level of ﬂood-risk areas (Newig et al. 2014), regarding
the biodiversity regime (Paavola et al. 2009), or the
Ambient Air Quality Directive (Newig and Koontz 2014).
Research on scalar, multi-level, and participatory govern-
ance will, therefore, continue to be relevant beyond the
implementation of the WFD.
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kooperationen sowie der erweiterten Fachgruppen OW, GW und
der FG WA über die Umsetzung der EG Wasserrahmenrichtlinie
am 12.09.2006 in Verden. Referat 21, Hannover
Lower Saxony Ministry of Environment (2015) Niedersa ̈chsischer
Beitrag zu den Bewirtschaftungspla ̈nen 2015 bis 2021 der
Flussgebiete Elbe, Weser, Ems und Rhein nach § 118 des
Niedersa ̈chsischen Wassergesetzes bzw. nach Art. 13 der EG-
Wasserrahmenrichtlinie, Hannover
Meadowcroft J (2002) Politics and scale: some implications for
environmental governance. Landsc Urban Plan 61:169–179
Mitchell RB (2008) Evaluating the performance of environmental
institutions: what to evaluate and how to evaluate it? In: Young
OR, King LA, Schroeder H (eds) Institutions and environmental
change. principal ﬁndings, applications, and research frontiers.
MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 79–114
Moss T (2003) solving problems of ‘ﬁt’ at the expense of problems of
‘interplay’? the spatial reorganisation of water management fol-
lowing the EU Water Framework Directive. In:Breit H, Engels A,
Moss T, Troja M (eds) How Institutions change. Perspectives on
Social Learning in Global and Local Environmental contexts.
Leske + Budrich, Opladen, pp 85–121
Moss T (2004) The governance of land use in river basins: prospects
for overcoming problems of institutional interplay with the EU
Water Framework Directive. Land Use Policy 21:85–94
Moss T (2009) Intermediaries and the governance of sociotechnical
networks in transition. Environ Plan A 41:1480–1495
Moss T (2012) Spatial ﬁt, from panacea to practice: implementing the
EU Water Framework Directive. Ecol Soc 17(3):2
Moss T, Newig J (2010) Multi-level water governance and problems
of scale. Setting the stage for a broader debate. Environ Manage
45:1–6
Newig J, Challies E, Jager N, Kochskämper E (2014) What role for
public participation in implementing the EU ﬂoods directive? A
comparison with the Water Framework Directive, early evidence
from Germany, and a research agenda. Environ Policy Govern-
ance 24:275–288
Newig J, Fritsch O (2009) Environmental governance: participatory,
multi-level—and effective? Environ Policy Governance
19:197–214
Newig J, Koontz TM (2014) Multi-level governance, policy imple-
mentation and participation: the EU’s mandated participatory
planning approach to implementing environmental policy. J Eur
Public Policy 21:248–267
NLWKN (2009) Niedersa ̈chsischer Beitrag für den Bewirtschaf-
tungsplan für die Flussgebietseinheit Ems nach Art. 13 der EG-
Wasserrahmenrichtlinie bzw. nach § 184a des Niedersa ̈chsischen
Wassergesetzes, Lüneburg: Niedersa ̈chsischer Landesbetrieb für
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